Ransomware in the food industry

Ransomware has become one of the most serious threats to IT infrastructures worldwide in recent years. In this context, the food industry has proven to be particularly vulnerable. Traditionally focused on operational efficiency and logistics, many companies in the sector have relegated cybersecurity to a secondary concern. However, the exponential rise in attacks has forced an urgent reevaluation of digital defense strategies. The ransomware attack suffered by JBS Foods in 2021 was not only one of the most publicized, but also a paradigmatic case that exposed structural vulnerabilities in one of the world’s largest meat processing companies.

The evolution of ransomware in the food industry over the past seven years

Between 2018 and 2023, ransomware became a systemic problem for the food industry. An analysis of 157 confirmed incidents shows that organizations in the sector suffered cumulative losses exceeding $1.3 billion in downtime, ransom payments, and recovery costs.

The year 2021 was particularly critical, marked by an unprecedented surge in attacks. A total of 64 confirmed ransomware incidents were recorded that year alone, accounting for nearly 40% of the five-year total. Cybercriminals, taking advantage of increased industrial automation, hyperconnected supply chains, and a global pandemic that accelerated digital transformation, found the food industry to be a highly lucrative target.

Ransom demands ranged from $20,000 to $15 million per incident. In addition to data encryption, many cybercriminal groups adopted double extortion tactics, threatening to leak sensitive information if their demands were not met. Affected organizations faced an average of 11.5 days of operational downtime, leading to supply chain disruptions, reputational damage, and direct financial losses.

The JBS attack: analysis

JBS S.A., headquartered in Brazil, is the largest meat processor in the world, with operations in over 20 countries and annual sales exceeding $50 billion. In May 2021, the company suffered a devastating ransomware attack that disrupted its operations in the United States, Canada, and Australia. The criminal group REvil, known for its aggressive and sophisticated tactics, was identified as the perpetrator of the incident.

The attack was not spontaneous. According to information obtained from SecurityScorecard and records from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the intrusion began at least three months before the full-scale encryption event. During that time, the attackers carried out lateral movement, network reconnaissance, and systematic data exfiltration. It is estimated that between 45 GB and 5 TB of sensitive information was transferred to external servers. Much of this data came from subsidiaries in Australia and Brazil and was sent to servers in Hong Kong and cloud services such as Mega.

On May 30, JBS’s IT systems were encrypted, forcing the company to temporarily shut down 13 processing plants in the United States, including facilities in Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin. This disruption affected approximately 20% of the country’s meat supply, causing immediate impacts on pricing and retail logistics.

What was not widely reported in mainstream media was the company's cybersecurity posture prior to the attack. According to leaked documents, JBS had a poor digital security framework. There were multiple persistent malware infections, including variants of the Conficker worm. Early detection systems were either limited or nonexistent, and the company’s vulnerability management practices were rudimentary. Despite operating as part of critical infrastructure, JBS lacked effective segmentation between IT and OT environments, which facilitated the rapid spread of the attack.

The incident culminated in the decision to pay a ransom of $11 million in Bitcoin, which the company justified as a way to “protect customers” and mitigate further damage. This action drew criticism from numerous cybersecurity experts, as it reinforced the economic viability of ransomware-as-a-service operations.

Technical analysis of the attack vector

Las investigaciones posteriores revelaron que REvil utilizó una combinación de técnicas avanzadas. La intrusión inicial probablemente ocurrió a través de credenciales comprometidas, posiblemente obtenidas por phishing o mediante acceso a VPNs vulnerables. Posteriormente, los atacantes escalaron privilegios utilizando herramientas como Cobalt Strike, realizaron reconocimiento mediante PowerShell, y utilizaron exfiltración encubierta con protocolos HTTPS y almacenamiento en la nube cifrado.

Subsequent investigations revealed that REvil used a combination of advanced techniques. The initial intrusion likely occurred via compromised credentials, potentially obtained through phishing or by exploiting vulnerabilities in VPN access. The attackers then escalated privileges using tools like Cobalt Strike, conducted reconnaissance using PowerShell, and carried out covert data exfiltration via HTTPS protocols and encrypted cloud storage.

Next-generation cybersecurity measures for the food industry

Following incidents like the one involving JBS, the food industry has begun to take more serious steps to strengthen its defenses. These efforts include both organizational and technical actions:

Network segmentation and OT environment protection

One of the foundational principles many companies are now adopting is strict segmentation between IT (corporate information) and OT (operational technology) networks. This involves the creation of demilitarized zones (DMZs), the use of industrial-grade firewalls, and the enforcement of highly restrictive communication rules. The Zero Trust philosophy is also being implemented, ensuring that no communication is trusted by default, not even within the internal network.

Asset visibility and inventory

Effective threat detection begins with knowing what devices and services are connected. Many companies are investing in asset discovery solutions to identify and monitor both OT and IT environments. This includes not only servers and workstations, but also sensors, PLCs, and IoT devices.

Vulnerability and patch management

A major shift in the industry has been the adoption of continuous vulnerability management programs. These programs proactively detect CVEs (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), assess their criticality based on operational impact, and schedule patching during designated maintenance windows. In cases where direct updates are not feasible, virtual patching through firewalls is increasingly being used as a mitigation strategy.

Resilient backup strategies

The 3-2-1 backup rule has become a standard practice: three backup copies, on two different media types, with one copy stored off-site and protected against modification. Additionally, companies are deploying immutable backup solutions, which prevent malicious encryption or deletion, even if an attacker gains access to backup credentials.

Early detection and threat intelligence

Incident response and simulation exercises

Incident Response Plans (IRPs) are being reviewed and formalized across the industry. These plans outline the steps to be taken in the event of a breach, including roles and responsibilities, internal and external communication protocols, coordination with authorities, and system restoration procedures.

The JBS case marked a turning point for the food industry. It revealed that even the largest and most globally integrated companies can be extremely vulnerable if they lack robust cybersecurity strategies. Ransomware is no longer just an IT issue, it is a direct threat to operational continuity, food security, and the global economy.

Countering this threat requires a deep transformation in the cybersecurity culture of the sector. It’s not just about technology, it’s about processes, training, continuous monitoring, and international cooperation. In this new landscape, anticipation is the best defense, and digital resilience becomes a strategic asset.